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Abstract 
With the election of Donald Trump and the Republican Party’s 
domination of Congress, House Speaker Paul Ryan’s blueprint for 
fundamental tax reform requires more careful analysis.  The Ryan 
blueprint combines reduced individual rates with a destination-based 
cash flow type business tax applicable to all businesses.  The 
destination-based business tax at the center of the blueprint has 
several major problems: It is incompatible with our WTO obligations, 
it is incompatible with our tax treaties, and it will not eliminate the 
problems of income shifting and inversions it is designed to address.  
In addition, these proposals generate vexing technical problems that 
are not easily fixed as well as significant political problems.  Finally, 
due to the tax rates that have been proposed, the plan is likely to 
generate large revenue losses and a less progressive tax system. We 
conclude by recommending better tax policy solutions to our current 
corporate tax problems. 
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This part describes the Ryan proposal in more detail, 
describing in particular the plan’s destination-basis corporate tax.  Part 
II discusses problems of WTO compatibility and trade distortions 
under this plan.  Part III discusses issues surrounding tax treaty 
compatibility, and Part IV discusses the lingering potential for profit 
shifting under the plan.  Part V describes technical problems associated 
with implementing the plan.  Part VI addresses effects on the 
progressivity of the tax system and on government revenues, and Part 
VII concludes and offers other suggestions for reform. 
House Speaker Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) blueprint to reform the tax 
code is gaining new prominence because of the Republican 
ascendancy in Washington following the 2016 election. 1   Since 
President Trump is likely to sign any tax reform passed by a 
Republican Congress, it is worth serious consideration. 
The introduction to the Ryan proposal (the “Blueprint”) states 
that: 
This Blueprint represents a dramatic reform of the 
current income tax system.  This Blueprint does not 
include a value-added tax (VAT), a sales tax, or any 
other tax as an addition to the fundamental reforms of 
the current income tax system.  The reforms reflected 
in this Blueprint will deliver a 21st century tax code that 
is built for growth and that puts America first.2 
This statement is important, because as will be discussed 
below, the business part of the proposal can be seen as a modified 
subtraction method VAT.  If it were a VAT, it would not have 
problems with tax treaties or with the WTO rules.  But since it declares 
itself not to be a VAT, and has at least one crucial feature that differs 
from a VAT, it may have problems with both. 
The individual tax section of the Blueprint is not a structural 
change, although it is quite regressive and would lead to massive 
budget deficits. 3   It envisages a lower rate structure for ordinary 
                                                      
1 A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, GOP TAX REFORM 
TASK FORCE (June 24, 2016), 
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf 
[perma.cc/G6B3-YMT3].   
2 Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
3 See Leonard E. Burman, James R. Nunns, Benjamin R. Page, Jeffrey 
Rohaly & Joseph Rosenberg, An Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan, 8 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 257 (2017) (estimating that the Blueprint would decrease revenue and 
increase the debt by $3 trillion over the first decade).   
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income (up to 33%), a capital gains and dividends and interest rate that 
is half the rate for ordinary income (up to 16.5%), and abolishing the 
individual AMT and estate tax.  For pass-through businesses, the 
Blueprint envisages a rate of 25%, with special provisions to prevent 
shifting of wage income to pass-throughs.4 
A particularly radical portion of the Blueprint is the corporate 
section.  In addition to cutting the corporate tax from 35% to 20%, the 
Blueprint envisages three major reforms.5  First, businesses will be 
allowed to expense capital expenditures, resulting in a zero rate for the 
marginal return on investment: 
This Blueprint will provide businesses with the benefit 
of fully and immediately writing off (or “expensing”) 
the cost of investments.  This represents a 0 percent 
marginal effective tax rate on new investment.6  
Second, businesses will not be able to deduct net interest expense: 
Under this Blueprint, job creators will be allowed to 
deduct interest expense against any interest income, but 
no current deduction will be allowed for net interest 
expense.  Any net interest expense may be carried 
forward indefinitely and allowed as a deduction against 
net interest income in future years.7  
Third, the Blueprint will be destination-based, i.e., be fully imposed 
on imports (without any deductions) and not imposed at all on exports: 
This Blueprint eliminates the existing self-imposed 
export penalty and import subsidy by moving to a 
destination-basis tax system.  Under a destination-basis 
approach, tax jurisdiction follows the location of 
consumption rather than the location of production.  
This Blueprint achieves this by providing for border 
adjustments exempting exports and taxing imports, not 
through the addition of a new tax but within the 
                                                      
4 The Tax Policy Center analysis mentions that there would likely be large 
enforcement problems with these rules, especially given the large rate differential 
under the plan.  See Burman et al., supra note 3.  Nonetheless, they assume that the 
rules would be enforceable in their revenue analysis.  The plan would lose even 
more revenue absent that assumption. 
5 As explained below, if the Blueprint proposal reduced profit shifting 
opportunities as its proponents believe, it is not clear why a rate cut is indicated 
since the main rationale to cut corporate tax rate is reducing base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS).   
6 A Better Way, supra note 1, at 25. 
7 Id. at 26. 
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context of the transformed business tax system.  The 
Blueprint also ends the uncompetitive worldwide tax 
approach of the United States, replacing it with a 
territorial tax system that is consistent with the 
approach used by our major trading partners.8  
This means that imports will be taxed and exports exempted.  
In addition, the Blueprint will enable dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S.-based multinationals to be fully exempt, but will 
maintain the current Subpart F provisions for passive income, 
eliminating only the base company rule and section 956:9  
Today, all of our major trading partners raise a 
significant portion of their tax revenues through value-
added taxes (VATs).  These VATs include “border 
adjustability” as a key feature.  This means that the tax 
is rebated when a product is exported to a foreign 
country and is imposed when a product is imported 
from a foreign country.  These border adjustments 
reduce the costs borne by exported products and 
increase the costs borne by imported products.  When 
the country is trading with another country that 
similarly imposes a border-adjustable VAT, the effects 
in both directions are offsetting and the tax costs borne 
by exports and imports are in relative balance.  
However, that balance does not exist when the trading 
partner is the United States.  In the absence of border 
adjustments, exports from the United States implicitly 
bear the cost of the U.S. income tax while imports into 
the United States do not bear any U.S. income tax cost.  
This amounts to a self-imposed unilateral penalty on 
U.S. exports and a self-imposed unilateral subsidy for 
U.S. imports. 
Because this Blueprint reflects a move toward a 
cash-flow tax approach for businesses, which 
reflects a consumption-based tax, the United States 
will be able to compete on a level playing field by 
                                                      
8 Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
9 The base company rule, I.R.C. § 954 (2015), provides that selling goods 
or services through a “base company” in a low-tax jurisdiction triggers U.S. tax to 
the parent, and I.R.C. § 956 (2007) provides that using income otherwise eligible 
for deferral to invest in U.S. property (including a loan to the parent) triggers U.S. 
tax to the parent.  The latter rule has been under pressure recently because of the 
$2.5 trillion in deferred income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents located in 
low-tax jurisdictions. 
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applying border adjustments within the context of 
our transformed business and corporate tax system.  
For the first time ever, the United States will be able to 
counter the border adjustments that our trading partners 
apply in their VATs.  The cash-flow based approach 
that will replace our current income-based approach for 
taxing both corporate and non-corporate businesses 
will be applied on a destination basis.  This means that 
products, services and intangibles that are exported 
outside the United States will not be subject to U.S. tax 
regardless of where they are produced.  It also means 
that products, services and intangibles that are imported 
into the United States will be subject to U.S. tax 
regardless of where they are produced.  This will 
eliminate the incentives created by our current tax 
system to move or locate operations outside the United 
States.  It also will allow U.S. products, services, and 
intangibles to compete on a more equal footing in both 
the U.S. market and the global market.10  
The Blueprint then addresses the potential WTO issue as follows: 
The rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
include longstanding provisions regarding the use of 
border adjustments.  Under these rules, border 
adjustments upon export are permitted with respect to 
consumption-based taxes, which are referred to as 
indirect taxes.  However, under these rules, border 
adjustments upon export are not permitted with respect 
to income taxes, which are referred to as direct taxes.  
This disparate treatment of different tax systems is what 
has created the historic imbalance between the United 
States, which has relied on an income tax – or direct tax 
in WTO parlance – for taxing business transactions, 
and our trading partners, which rely to a significant 
extent on a VAT – or indirect tax in WTO parlance – 
for taxing business transactions.  Under WTO rules, the 
United States has been precluded from applying the 
border adjustments to U.S. exports and imports 
necessary to balance the treatment applied by our 
trading partners to their exports and imports.  With this 
Blueprint’s move toward a consumption-based tax 
approach, in the form of a cash-flow focused 
                                                      
10 A Better Way, supra note 1 at 28 (emphasis added). 
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approach for taxing business income, the United 
States now has the opportunity to incorporate 
border adjustments in the new tax system consistent 
with the WTO rules regarding indirect taxes.11  
This approach is similar to the one taken by the 2005 advisory 
panel on tax reform in the Growth and Investment Tax (GIT) proposal.  
Under the GIT, corporations were subject to a cash flow tax with 
expensing and no deduction for interest, but wages were deductible.  
The GIT was destination-based, but for revenue estimating purposes, 
the revenue associated with border adjustments was disregarded 
because of concerns about WTO compatibility.  Since the U.S. has a 
large trade deficit, this represented a difference of $775 billion dollars 
in revenues over the ten-year budget window.12  According to the Tax 
Policy Center analysis (2017), the revenue effects of the border 
adjustment are even larger now, at about $1.2 billion dollars.13 
II. IS THE “BETTER WAY” PROPOSAL COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE WTO? 
Under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) Agreement,14 a tax may only be border adjustable if it is an 
“indirect” tax.  A border adjustable “direct” tax is a prohibited export 
subsidy that can subject the U.S. to trade sanctions.   
Annex I of the SCM includes as a prohibited export subsidy:15  
(e) The full or partial exemption remission, or 
deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes 
(58) or social welfare charges paid or payable by 
industrial or commercial enterprises (59). 
Footnote 58 provides: 
For the purpose of this Agreement: 
                                                      
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
12 Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM (Nov. 
2005), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-
Tax-System-2005.pdf [perma.cc/V6HP-NXPW] at 172.   
13 Burman et al., supra note 3. 
14 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
14 [hereinafter SCM]. 
15 In addition, it is likely that the Blueprint would constitute prohibited 
discrimination against imports and in favour of domestic production under Article 
3 of the GATT, because foreign businesses exporting to the U.S. would be pressed 
to move production to the U.S. in order to get a deduction for wages.  This is 
particularly true for manufacturing units in developing countries, where you do not 
have sufficient local sales to compensate with.  See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].   
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The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, 
profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of 
income, and taxes on the ownership of real property; 
… 
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, 
turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all 
taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.16  
Footnote 59 provides: 
The Members recognize that deferral need not 
amount to an export subsidy where, for example, 
appropriate interest charges are collected.  The 
Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in 
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign 
buyers under their or under the same control should for 
tax purposes be the prices which would be charged 
between independent enterprises acting at arm's length.  
Any Member may draw the attention of another 
Member to administrative or other practices which may 
contravene this principle and which result in a 
significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions.  
In such circumstances the Members shall normally 
attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities 
of existing bilateral tax treaties or other specific 
international mechanisms, without prejudice to the 
rights and obligations of Members under GATT 1994, 
including the right of consultation created in the 
preceding sentence. 
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member 
from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of 
foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the 
enterprises of another Member.17  
The business tax regime of the Blueprint can be seen as a 
modified version of a consumption tax–specifically, a subtraction 
method VAT (although the Blueprint explicitly denies that it is a 
VAT).  Specifically, the Blueprint imposes tax on cash flow, allows 
                                                      
16 SCM, supra note 16 (emphasis added). 
17 Id.   
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expensing of capital expenditures, and disallows net interest expense.  
All of these are also features of a subtraction method VAT.18  
However, the Blueprint does allow a deduction for wages, 
while a subtraction method VAT would disallow them.  This feature 
makes the Ryan tax not WTO compatible.19  Fundamentally, we need 
to consider the reason why a VAT, whether using a credit-invoice or 
subtraction method of calculating the tax, is border adjustable.  Sales 
taxes, excises and VATs are border adjustable because there is no 
distortion introduced by the tax; goods receive like tax treatment in the 
domestic market irrespective of where they are produced.  Both the tax 
component in exports and the price of imports are measurable, and the 
border adjustment does not exceed the tax that is levied because (in the 
case of import) the full tax is levied at the border, and (in the case of 
exports) the refunded amount in an invoice-credit VAT is only the 
amount that was levied at previous stages, as shown on the invoice.  
By so limiting border adjustments, the WTO reduces opportunities for 
countries to subsidize exports or overtax imports.    
The Ryan Blueprint’s treatment of purchases (including capital 
and inventory) and labor highlights the difference between a tax on 
value added and Ryan’s tax on an income base.   
If the factors of production employed at each stage of 
production and distribution of goods are totaled up, they should equal 
                                                      
18 A subtraction method VAT is a cash-flow tax that includes all sales but 
allows a deduction for all outlays, except for interest and wages.  In principle, it has 
the same tax base as the normal invoice-credit VAT, as adopted by most countries.  
In an invoice-credit VAT, tax is paid at each stage of production on the sale price 
of outputs, with a credit given for tax on inputs.  Both methods can be origin or 
destination-based, but all existing VATs are destination-based (imports are taxed 
and exports are exempt).  The main difference is administrability: In an invoice-
credit VAT, no credit is given unless tax was paid on the input, as shown on an 
invoice.  In a subtraction method VAT, care must be taken not to allow a deduction 
unless there is a corresponding inclusion by the provider of goods, services or 
intangibles.  This difference explains why no country has adopted a subtraction 
method VAT.  The Blueprint proposal is based on a subtraction method VAT, but 
with a deduction for wages. 
19 For similar conclusions, see Wolfgang Schön, Destination-Based 
Income Taxation and WTO Law: A Note (Max Planck Inst. for Tax Law and Pub. 
Fin., Working Paper No. 03, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727628 
[perma.cc/T5M3-TNDF]; Wei Cui, Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A 
Critical Appraisal (Sept. 30, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614780 [perma.cc/J6GW-QNMQ]; Wei Cui, 
Destination-Based Taxation in the House Republican Blueprint, 173 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 7 (2016); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Freedom Fries: The House 
Republicans’ Cash Flow Tax (Section 954 – Foreign Base Company Income), 157 
TAX NOTES TODAY 1 (2016). 
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the retail sales price of the goods.  A traditional VAT is imposed 
mainly on two factors of production, labor (about 2/3 of base) and 
income from capital or rents (extra profits above the normal return to 
capital).  Under a sales-subtraction method VAT, taxes are collected 
and remitted to the government by business at each stage of production 
and distribution.  The resulting tax should be equal to the tax imposed 
on the retail price of taxable goods under a single-stage retail sales tax.  
Purchases taxed at a prior stage of production or distribution are 
deductible, so that this value is not taxed again.  Under that method of 
calculating VAT, the cost of labor is not deductible so that this factor 
of production can be included in the tax base.  In contrast, under the 
Ryan Blueprint tax, a business can take an immediate deduction for its 
wage expense, leaving that factor of production out of the tax base.  
Workers bear tax at multiple rates on that labor income under the 
individual income tax.  Even if the tax paid by the workers may be 
viewed as a surrogate for a business’s tax on labor, that surrogate tax 
cannot be accurately measured and that tax cost does not enter the tax-
inclusive prices of the business’s outputs.  Giving a full deduction for 
labor costs effectively subsidizes exports and overtaxes imports. 
For example: Assume that a domestic grape grower has no 
business inputs.  He has labor costs of 30 and profit of 10.  He sells the 
grapes to a wine producer for 30 + 10 = 40.  Since labor is deductible, 
the grape grower pays tax only on his profit.  The tax is 10 x 20% = 2, 
so the tax inclusive price is 40 + 2 = 42.20  The wine producer buys the 
grapes for 42.  She has labor costs of 45 and profit of 15.  She sells the 
wine to a domestic consumer for 42 + 45 + 15 = 102, and pays tax only 
on the profits of 15 since the other elements are deductible.  Total tax 
paid by the wine producer is 15 x 20% = 3, and the tax inclusive price 
to the consumer is 102 + 3 = 105.   
If the wine producer instead exports the wine by selling it to a 
foreign customer, she has 100 in exempt income, or zero income 
(assuming no other income).  She also has 40 + 45 = 85 in deductible 
costs, so in principle she should get a check from the Treasury of 85 x 
20% = 17.21  The foreign customer, assuming that his country also 
charges 20% VAT on imports, will pay 100 plus VAT of 100 x 20% = 
20, and the tax inclusive price will be 120.  Note that this is a higher 
                                                      
20 In this example, we assume that the tax gets passed on to consumers in 
the form of higher prices. 
21 Under the Blueprint, Net Operating Losses (NOLs) are carried forward 
with an interest charge, rather resulting in an actual refund, but the end result 
should be the same.  Still, many exporters may never show positive income under 
this tax system, so they may not be able to use NOLs. 
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price than the price to the domestic wine consumer, because in the 
domestic sales the costs of goods sold and the labor are deductible 
whereas in the foreign sale they are not. 
Now let us compare this to a normal invoice credit VAT of 
20%.  In the domestic case, the grape grower has 30 in labor costs and 
10 of profit, and he will charge the wine producer a tax inclusive price 
of 40 + (40 x 20%) = 48.  The wine producer will pay 48 to the grape 
grower and has 45 of labor costs and 15 of profits, so she will charge 
a tax inclusive price of 48 + 45 + 15 = 108 minus 8 refund of VAT 
paid on inputs, or 100 + (100 x 20%) = 120.   
In the export case with an invoice-credit VAT, the grape 
grower still charges the wine producer 48.  The wine producer adds 
labor costs of 45 and profits of 15 and since the wine is exported in a 
zero rated sale she receives a refund of 8 and the sale price to the 
foreign consumer is 48 + 45 + 15 – 8 = 100, plus 20% foreign VAT or 
120.   
If we compare the two cases, under the Ryan tax the domestic 
consumer pays 105 and the foreign consumer 120.  The difference of 
15 is the tax on the deductible U.S. labor costs (= (30 + 45) x 0.20).  
But if the wine producer wants to undercut wine produced in the 
foreign country, she can easily afford to sell for less than 100.  
Specifically, she could sell for as low as (100 – 17) + 20%, or $99.60 
(tax inclusive).  This demonstrates the export subsidy, which results 
from the ability to deduct labor costs in the U.S., whereas such costs 
are not deductible in the normal VAT in the foreign country.  Under 
the normal VAT, the prices to the domestic and foreign customers are 
the same (120 domestic, 120 foreign) and there is no check from the 
Treasury other than the refund of VAT actually paid.   
The reason for the export subsidy in the Ryan tax is that labor 
costs are deductible.  In theory this should not make a difference if we 
could be sure that labor is subject to at least a 20% tax rate, since then 
the deduction and inclusion would offset each other.  However, much 
labor income is taxed at lower rates due to the progressivity of the 
federal income tax as well as the earned income tax credit.  Ryan also 
envisages a zero bracket of the first $24,000 of income and a 12% rate 
for those currently in the 10 or 15% brackets, so it is likely that many 
of the employees of the grape grower and the wine producer will be 
subject to individual tax at less than 20%.   
Thus, the Ryan Blueprint should be classified as a modified 
consumption-style tax imposed on an income base.  As such, it is 
not a border adjustable tax under the WTO rules, as currently 
interpreted.  If the U.S. treated a Ryan-type tax as border adjustable, 
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we can expect our international competitors to challenge the tax at the 
WTO before it takes effect. 
Economists, however, argue that exchange rate changes may 
offset this, because U.S. dollar appreciation would undo the export 
subsidy.22  But the exchange rate offset will not be perfect since the 
tax treatment will depend on individual firm circumstances, and the 
exchange rate only affects the overall prices of imports relative to 
exports.  In particular, different goods will receive the export subsidy 
to different extents, because not all goods have the same share of labor 
in their production costs, and different tax rates apply to corporate and 
pass-through business.  Yet any exchange rate changes will affect all 
goods equally. 
Even more important, the literature on exchange rate 
determination makes any exchange rate offset hardly predictable or 
clear cut.  Empirical studies in international finance makes it quite 
clear that exchange rates movements are divorced from most coherent 
theories of exchange rate determination.  As noted by Rogoff:23  
The extent to which monetary models, or indeed, any 
existing structural models of exchange rates, fail to 
explain even medium term volatility is difficult to 
overstate.  The out-of-sample forecasting performance 
of the models is so mediocre that at horizons of one 
month to two years they fail to outperform a naïve 
random walk model (which says that the best forecast 
of any future exchange rate is today’s rate).  Almost 
incredibly, this result holds even when the model 
forecasts are based on actual realized values of the 
explanatory variables.24  
This may be due in part to the huge speculative component of 
exchange rate trading.  The foreign exchange market has transactions 
that exceed $5 trillion each day; the U.S. dollar is involved in 88% of 
these currency trades.25  Compare the size of the world economy, with 
an annual GDP of about $75 trillion.  All of world GDP could be 
                                                      
22 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Role of Border 
Adjustments in International Taxation, AM.  ACTION FORUM (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://www.americanactionforum.org/research/14344/ [perma.cc/YY2W-GJ6F].   
23 Kenneth Rogoff, Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility, 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 441-53 (Martin Feldstein ed.,1999).    
24 Id. at 444. 
25 See Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange Turnover in 
April 2016, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16fx.pdf [perma.cc/2NVK-UAVP].   
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purchased with about 15 days of foreign exchange!  Thus, the bulk of 
exchange rate trading is not related to the purchase of goods or even 
assets, but rather to financial market trading.  This may help explain 
why exchange rate movements are difficult to predict with standard 
theories or macroeconomic models.  Indeed, macroeconomists have a 
dismal record of predicting exchange rate movements based on any 
fundamental theories of exchange rate determination.  Thus, there 
should be grave doubts that exchange rate changes will smoothly offset 
the effects of the border adjustment. 
The exchange rate offset argument is sometimes made by 
noting that trade must balance in the long run, or by simply assuming 
balanced trade.  Yet while trade must balance in the long run, there is 
no reason why countries can’t run persistent trade deficits and 
surpluses.  Indeed, the United States has experienced a trade deficit for 
every year of the last 40 years.  Our persistent trade deficit is due to 
macroeconomic considerations, and in particular, the fact that U.S. 
savings are low relative to our private investment desires and 
government borrowing.26  If nothing changes those macroeconomic 
variables, then our trade deficit should remain constant, so the 
exchange rate offset must offset any trade distortions introduced by the 
tax changes.  Still, it is far from clear that a tax change of the magnitude 
imagined here would not affect macroeconomic variables such as 
savings, investment, tax revenues, and government spending. 
In addition, many countries do indeed fix their exchange rates, 
and this will also slow any adjustment to the introduction of the Ryan 
tax.27  Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin recognize that, but they note that 
most countries do this for reasons of “competitiveness” and therefore 
could be expected to adjust pegs accordingly.28  We disagree.  Most 
countries peg to achieve other macroeconomic goals, and in particular 
                                                      
26 The borrowing that occurs from abroad is the “flip side” of the trade 
deficit.  In particular, basic national income accounting indicates that EX-IM (the 
trade balance) must always equal the sum of the private savings/investment balance 
(S-I) and the government budget balance of tax revenues relative to government 
spending (T-G).  In the case of the United States, our trade balance is often 
negative since our savings (S) fall short of demand for loanable funds due to 
private Investment (I) and government borrowing (G-T).    
27 In the IMF survey of exchange rate regimes, they classify only 29 of 
191 countries as freely floating.  Other countries have other arrangements, 
including fixed rates, currency boards, and more actively “managed” floats.  See 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2014/areaers/ar2014.pdf [perma.cc/L4H7-
VXZG] 
28 Auerbach & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 22. 
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to import creditability with respect to monetary policy, to target 
inflation, to enhance exchange rate stability, etc.  It is far from clear 
that competitiveness is the determinative motive in most cases.  (And 
often pegs will have the opposite effect, when countries intervene to 
support overvalued currencies.) 
Further, trade contracts are often set in advance in dollar terms, 
so even if exchange rates were to adjust immediately and fully, there 
would still be a disruptive lag in terms of effects on those engaged in 
international trade.  This shock could be quite damaging to retailers in 
the short run.  Also, if lags in exchange rate adjustment convince 
trading partners to undertake protectionist trade measures in response, 
those measures are likely to prove more long-lasting. 
In addition, one shouldn’t be sanguine about the effects of a 
large dollar appreciation, as this redistributes wealth away from U.S. 
owners of foreign assets (since their assets are now worth less in dollar 
terms) and toward foreign owners of U.S. assets.  These wealth effects 
involve amounts in the trillions of dollars.29  Dollar appreciation can 
also have dire fiscal consequences for emerging economies that are 
borrowing in dollars; indeed U.S. dollar appreciation played a large 
contributing role in several past developing country debt crises, 
including the Latin American debt crises of the mid 1980s and the 
Argentine debt crisis and default of 2001.30 
We are not aware of any empirical evidence on the exchange 
rate mechanism, but that should be provided before adjustment is taken 
on faith.  Indeed, it seems dangerous to “bet” entire sectors of the 
economy on such untested grounds, especially when no other major 
country has adopted this type of corporate tax.  The only empirical 
study, by Desai and Hines, in fact suggests that trade effects may be 
counter to expectations.  According to Desai and Hines, “[e]conomic 
theory implies that exchange rate adjustment prevents destination-
based VATs from affecting exports and imports.  Indeed, this 
proposition is so well accepted among economists that it has not been 
subjected to serious prior testing.”31  Still, Desai and Hines found that 
countries that relied on VATs actually had worse export performance 
                                                      
29 See, e.g., Alan Viard, Border Tax Adjustments Won’t Stimulate Exports, 
AM.  ENTER.  INST.  (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.aei.org/publication/border-tax-
adjustments-wont-stimulate-exports/ [perma.cc/65VB-695H].   
30 See Michael Graetz, The Known Unknowns of the Business Tax Reforms 
Proposed in the House Republican Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 117 (2017).  
31 Mihir Desai & James Hines, Value-Added Taxes and International 
Trade: The Evidence (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0245/59563b9d1470c5932a0b858bb9153ab750df.p
df [perma.cc/5SCZ-E7U5].   
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(and also lower imports), and this finding typically (but not always) 
persists when control variables and country fixed effects are 
included.32  
Desai and Hines note that the real world features of VATs can 
explain their finding, since VATs tend to fall more heavily on traded 
goods than non-traded goods, and export rebates are often incomplete, 
thus discouraging trade.  These two explanations also likely apply in 
the Ryan tax context.  For reasons explained below, the unlikelihood 
of exporters getting full rebates for their export “losses” are even 
stronger in the Ryan tax context than in a traditional VAT,33  and there 
is reason to believe that the Ryan tax will be imposed differentially on 
tangible goods than on services and intangibles (discussed below).34  
There are other WTO related problems with the Blueprint as 
well.  First, the Blueprint explicitly declares up front that it is not a 
VAT but a corporate income tax (“This Blueprint does not include a 
value-added tax (VAT), a sales tax, or any other tax as an addition to 
the fundamental reforms of the current income tax system”).  Second, 
the retention of an exemption for dividends from controlled foreign 
subsidiaries (on top of the destination basis) and subpart F and the 
imposition of tax on some interest and dividends make the Blueprint 
look more like a corporate income tax.  In contrast, VATs are purely 
destination-based and do not apply to any foreign source income, so 
territoriality is not needed, and financial flows are disregarded.   
Auerbach and Holtz Eakin argue that: 
There is an open question whether a destination-
based cash flow tax (DBCFT) would be determined to 
be compliant with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization.  There are two primary issues here.  First, 
                                                      
32 Id. 
33 Under the Blueprint, NOLs are carried forward with an interest charge.  
This may or may not result in an eventual payment.  Many exporting firms may not 
ever show a taxable profit under this system. 
34 A final bit of evidence comes from de Mooij & Keen, discussed within 
Auerbach, et al., Destination Based Cash-Flow Taxation 20-21 (Oxford U. Ctr. for 
Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper No. 17/01, 2017), 
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf [perma.cc/YVH9-QXL5].  
There is evidence that Eurozone countries that pursue fiscal devaluations (a 
combination of increased consumption taxes and reduced business taxes on labor 
that is similar to a destination-based cash-flow tax) do see a noticeable short-run 
increase in net exports.  See Ruud de Mooij & Michael Keen, ‘Fiscal Devaluation’ 
and Fiscal Consolidation: The VAT in Troubled Times (NBER, Working Paper No. 
17913, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17913.pdf [perma.cc/V7K4-5L9G].  
This working paper also appears in Fiscal Policy After the Crisis, U. OF CHICAGO 
PRESS 443-85, (Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi eds., 2013).   
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WTO rules currently limit border adjustments to 
“indirect” taxes – taxes on transactions (e.g., sales, 
payroll, etc.) rather than “direct” taxes on individuals 
or businesses.  It is not clear that a DBCFT would be 
successfully characterized as an indirect tax, even 
though it is economically equivalent to a policy based 
on indirect taxes (a VAT and a reduction in payroll 
taxes), and even though the distinction between direct 
and indirect taxes has little meaning and no bearing on 
any economic outcomes.  In addition, there might be 
concerns under existing WTO rules regarding the 
combination of border adjustments with a deduction for 
domestic labor costs, since the border adjustment 
assessed on imported goods applies to the entire cost of 
the imports, with no deduction for the labor costs that 
went into the production of these imported goods.  
Some might see this treatment as favoring domestically 
produced goods over imported ones.  But such an 
inference makes little sense from an economic 
perspective.  Again, consider the equivalent policy of 
introducing a VAT and reducing payroll taxes, both 
elements of which are compatible with WTO rules.  A 
reduction in payroll taxes would indeed encourage 
domestic production and employment to the extent that 
it lowered domestic production costs.  But this is true 
of any reduction in taxes on US production, and it is 
difficult to comprehend why international trade rules 
should dictate the tax rate a country applies uniformly 
to its own domestic economic production activities.35  
Given these arguments, one might legitimately query why 
proponents have not simply suggested replacing the corporate tax with 
the combination of a VAT and a cut in payroll taxes.36  (Though to 
achieve a 20% wage subsidy, one would have to provide more tax 
relief than a complete elimination of the 15% payroll tax.) Still, 
regardless of the merits of such equivalence arguments, which neglect 
real world features of modern payroll taxes, it is unlikely that they will 
sway the WTO.  WTO decisions tend not to respect this type of 
                                                      
35 Auerbach & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 22.   
36 The real reason, one suspects, is the widely-held belief in the political 
implausibility of enacting a VAT in the United States.  Given the WTO issue 
facing any border-adjusted tax that is not a VAT, this belief may be misguided.  
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Inexorable Rise of the VAT: Is the U.S. Next?, 150 
TAX NOTES 127 (2016). 
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argument even if economists find this “difficult to comprehend.” The 
whole point of introducing the Ryan tax, as Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin 
concede, is to make the United States into a giant tax haven from the 
perspective of our trading partners, and induce their multinationals to 
move operations into the United States.37  Given the likely harm to 
their tax revenues from such a shift following the initial introduction 
of the Ryan tax, our trading partners, and especially the EU, are likely 
to sue.  The result would be years of litigation with an uncertain 
outcome and potentially very large trade sanctions.  Recent estimates 
suggest that dispute could result in retaliatory tariffs sufficient to 
eliminate over $200 billion in U.S. exports.38  
Such an outcome would be very worrisome for several reasons.  
First, we are already in an environment where the gains from trade are 
being threatened by a President that frequently urges the imposition of 
tariffs.  Adding protectionist features to the tax code, even if some 
economists are convinced that there would be no net effect on prices, 
risks misunderstanding and increases the probability of retaliatory 
tariffs.  Indeed, some countries have already pledged tariff retaliation 
if the United States moves forward with this plan.  Protracted and 
contentious litigation could also reduce the U.S. political backing for 
the WTO, harming both the long-run prospects for an open trading 
system and our international relations. 
Second, the ambiguities of whether these tax provisions would 
pass muster with the WTO creates a far more uncertain investment 
climate, making it more difficult for companies to resolve investment 
and location decisions.  Further, if there is no assurance that the tax 
will be retained, that could also hamper the process of exchange rate 
adjustment. 
Finally, if the WTO authorizes trade sanctions in response, 
such sanctions may lead to an endgame result where the U.S. 
government complies with the WTO by turning the Ryan tax into a 
“normal” VAT by denying the deduction for labor.  This would make 
the tax far more regressive than the proposed cash-flow corporate tax 
it replaces.39  Of course, the border adjustment feature could not be 
dropped without huge revenue losses as well as enormous tax 
                                                      
37 Auerbach & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 22 at 12-14. 
38 See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, WTO-consistency of the BTA and potential 
retaliation, Presentation at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Feb. 
1, 2017), in PETERSON INST.  FOR INT’L ECON., 
http://piie.com/system/files/documents/bown20170201ppt.pdf [perma.cc/43ML-
R27K]. 
39 See Sheppard, supra note 19, at 914.   
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avoidance and profit shifting problems.  Absent the border adjustment, 
the whole structure of the destination-based tax breaks down. 
III. WHAT ABOUT TAX TREATIES? 
There are three problems with tax treaties in the Blueprint, 
assuming that the proposed tax is an income tax subject to the treaties.  
The first problem is that if the business tax is an income tax covered 
by the treaties and we are serious about taxing on a destination basis 
goods and services imported into the U.S., we need to do away with 
the permanent establishment (PE) limitation in Article 7, because we 
need to be able to tax importers without a PE (or physical presence 
required under domestic law).  While we believe that this is a long 
overdue reform, bringing the income tax treaty into the 21st century 
and the age of electronic commerce,40 it should be recognized that it 
involves a massive treaty override of a crucial aspect of the treaty 
bargain, which was considered and rejected by our treaty partners in 
the BEPS context. 
The second problem is that if the business tax is an income tax, 
in order to levy it on a destination basis and include all imports, it must 
be imposed not just on goods and services (under Article 7) but also 
on intangibles that produce royalties (Article 12) and other types of 
deductible payments that can substitute for royalties (e.g., payments 
on derivatives, generally classified as Other Income under Article 21).  
While interest and dividends are not deductible, allowing royalties and 
derivatives to escape the tax on imports invites abuse (since there will 
always be lower tax jurisdictions).  This requires another treaty 
override that can be avoided if the business tax is a VAT. 
Finally, it could be argued that because the Ryan tax 
advantages domestic companies that export from the U.S. over similar 
foreign companies that import into the U.S., the Ryan tax is a violation 
of the non-discrimination provision of the treaties.41   
An important related question is how our treaty partners will 
react to such sweeping changes and treaty overrides (which they regard 
as violations of international law).  Given that the new U.S. tax (20% 
rate with expensing, territoriality, border adjustments) will create a 
strong attraction for foreign-based multinationals to shift profits into 
the U.S., it is likely that they will (a) refuse to give credit for the U.S. 
tax under tax treaties because (given expensing) it is not an income 
tax, and (b) apply their CFC rules to U.S. affiliate operations by their 
                                                      
40 Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 
52:3 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997). 
41 See Sheppard, supra note 19 at 909-10.   
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multinationals, which cannot invert in response because of exit taxes.  
The possible end result could be a collapse of the treaty-based 
international tax regime, to the disadvantage of U.S. taxpayer who will 
face increased withholding taxes overseas as well as increased transfer 
pricing enforcement.42   
IV. TAX AVOIDANCE, INCOME SHIFTING AND 
INVERSIONS 
The Better Way proposal argues that: 
Taken together, a 20 percent corporate rate, a 
switch to a territorial system, and border adjustments 
will cause the recent wave of inversions to come to a 
halt.  American businesses invert for two reasons: to 
avail themselves of a jurisdiction with a lower rate, and 
to access “trapped cash” overseas.  Those problems are 
solved by the lower corporate rate and the territorial 
system, respectively.  In addition, border adjustments 
mean that it does not matter where a company is 
incorporated; sales to U.S. customers are taxed and 
sales to foreign customers are exempt, regardless of 
whether the taxpayer is foreign or domestic.43  
We do not believe the Blueprint proposal will completely stop 
the incentive for U.S. corporations to shift income overseas, because 
even with a 20% rate and expensing, rents (for example, from 
intangibles such as Apple’s “Irish” profits) can still be located in zero 
tax jurisdictions and then repatriated tax-free.  While this problem can 
be minimized if it is limited to rents from exploiting foreign markets 
(which would be exempt even if carried out from the U.S.), we are 
doubtful that the line between U.S. and foreign markets can be drawn 
precisely where services and intangibles are concerned, where there 
can be no enforcement of the tax at the border.  Even a normal (invoice 
credit) VAT has issues where imports of services and intangibles are 
concerned, since it is difficult to collect the tax from consumers who 
are not eligible for deductions or input credits.44   
                                                      
42 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 
69 TAX NOTES 913 (1995); Reuven Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: 
Some International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L.  REV.  1329 (1996). 
43 A Better Way, supra note 1 at 26. 
44 For the serious problems raised by application of VAT to cross-border 
trade in services and intangibles, see International VAT/GST Guidelines, OECD 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/international-vat-gst-
guidelines.pdf [perma.cc/8TQB-885Y] (recommended by the Council in September 
2016).  In an invoice credit VAT, exports are zero-rated in the country of origin, so 
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Moreover, experienced tax practitioners have already 
suggested ways of gaming the Blueprint.  For example:45   
1. A U.S. pharmaceutical with foreign subsidiaries 
could develop its intellectual property in the United 
States (claiming deductions for wages, overhead 
and R&D), and then sell (i.e., export) the foreign 
rights to its Irish subsidiary (at the highest price 
possible).  The proceeds would not be taxable.  
Ireland would allow that subsidiary to amortize its 
purchase price.  This creates tax benefits in each 
jurisdiction by reason of the different regimes.  If 
the Irish subsidiary manufactures drugs, the profits 
could be distributed up to the U.S. parent tax-free 
under a territorial system.  If the Irish subsidiary is 
in danger of becoming profitable for Irish tax 
purposes, the U.S. parent would just sell it more IP.   
2. If an Irish parent owns a U.S. subsidiary, the Irish 
parent can issue debt to fund the purchases of the 
IP.  The U.S. subsidiary then invests the cash to 
generate more IP (expensing all equipment and 
deducting all salaries) and sells the IP to its parent.   
3. If an Irish parent has purchased the U.S. IP rights, 
it would not want to license the rights to the U.S. 
                                                      
a business importer does not get a tax credit on the purchase.  If there is an output 
tax to the final consumer, it is simply charged and paid (like a typical retail sale 
under the U.S. RST).  This means that, unlike the typical VAT situation, the entire 
collection even in a B2B context depends on the final sale to the consumer, and 
experience with retail sales taxes has illustrated that at high rates this becomes an 
avoidance problem (as anyone living in states that border states that do not tax sales 
can attest).  The real problem in the B2C domain is simply that there is no 
jurisdiction to enforce the B2C tax, because there is no jurisdiction over the remote 
supplier.  In the B2B context, the answer is the reverse charge, where the business 
purchaser self-assesses the tax and therefore gets an input tax credit on any further 
sale.  In the B2C context, relying on the consumer to self-assess the tax amounts to 
a tax on honesty (like the U.S. state use tax where there is no collection by the 
remote seller).  In general, determining exports and imports and tracking purchases 
of those engaged in cross-border business is not trivial.  It is difficult to judge 
where services are consumed and to trace location of downloaded services.   
45 Thanks to David Miller for suggesting these.  For further elaboration, 
see David S. Miller, How Donald Trump Can Keep His Campaign Promises, Grow 
the Economy, Cut Tax Rates, Repatriate Offshore Earnings, Reduce Income 
Inequality, Keep Jobs in the United States, and Reduce the Deficit (Tax Forum 
Paper No. 680, 2017), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908207 [perma.cc/2K9H-
5KDT]. 
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subsidiary (income for Irish parent under Irish tax 
law and no deduction for U.S. subsidiary).  So it just 
contributes the rights to another U.S. subsidiary.  
Could the U.S. subsidiary amortize the parent's 
basis under the Blueprint? When one U.S. 
subsidiary licenses to another, no net tax would be 
paid.  Any royalties would be taxable to the licensor 
but deductible for the payor.46 
4. How does the Blueprint work for services? If a U.S. 
hedge fund manager provides services to an 
offshore hedge fund, is that considered an export 
that is tax exempt? What if the U.S. manager 
develops a trading algorithm and sells it (or 
licenses) it to an offshore hedge fund? Are the 
proceeds and royalties exempt? If so, then the 
hedge fund becomes a giant tax shelter to the 
manager, because he would not pay 25% on this 
income – he would pay zero, with no further tax.  
This is much better than the current carried interest 
provision, which has attracted bipartisan 
condemnation because it enables individuals with 
income of many millions to pay a reduced rate.  The 
Blueprint result is much worse. 
V. VEXING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS 
First, this tax system is very difficult to explain to the public 
or, even, experts.  This creates a risk that loopholes will be easier to 
design due to the deliberate exploitation of the system’s complexity by 
savvy tax planners and lobbyists.  Yet if the system is implemented in 
a more theoretically pure form, without opening the door to loopholes, 
it is not clear that the MNC business community would support the 
proposed changes.  The net effect would be a tax increase for the 
intangible- intensive MNCs that had previously succeeded in 
achieving single-digit tax rates by gaming the old system (and shifting 
U.S. profits abroad).  It is also a tax increase for highly-leveraged 
firms, since debt-financed investments would no longer be subsidized.  
                                                      
46 As Miller argues, this example suggests that inversions would in some 
cases still be valuable.  Moreover, to the extent the Blueprint retains Subpart F, 
inversions can be helpful in avoiding it.  For example, if an Irish subsidiary of a 
U.S. parent licenses intangibles to consumers in the U.S. and because it is difficult 
to enforce the tax on the consumers the IRS relies on Subpart F to tax the royalties, 
this rule (which is included in what remains of Subpart F in the Blueprint) can be 
avoided by an inversion. 
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Retailers that import into the U.S. and manufacturers that import parts 
are likely to object to a new tax system that means they cannot deduct 
their cost of goods sold.   
Second, there is an increased likelihood that many profitable 
firms would show losses.  This is especially the case for exporters, 
since they may have deductible expenses, but no taxable revenue.  
Exporting firms with persistent losses will find the credits do them no 
good, which would affect export incentives.  While economists would 
support a refund system in order to keep tax neutral, there is a large 
potential for fraud, and politically it seems unlikely that the 
government could issue large checks to profitable corporations on a 
permanent basis.  The alternative suggested by the Blueprint is 
unlimited carry-forwards, but this doesn’t solve the problem for 
businesses with losses that may not be offset.  And this introduces new 
trade distortions since the border adjustment is not symmetric.  
Exporting companies could of course merge with non-exporters in 
order for the losses to be more useful, but inducing a slew of tax-
motivated mergers would be inefficient. 
Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin recognize that this would be a large 
problem for exporting firms.  They suggest allowing firms to use 
credits to offset payroll taxes, or have a system of refundable border 
adjustments, but both of these solutions are problematic and difficult 
to implement.47  
Third, there are myriad technical problems that remain to be 
worked out.  For example, financial institutions require separate 
treatment.  The pure form of this tax leaves out financial flows entirely.  
An augmented form of the tax can capture financial transactions in the 
base, but this would introduce complexity as all companies would need 
to keep track of financial transactions, as well as whether the 
transactions occurred with foreign companies.  There is also 
substantial ambiguity between what transactions are real and what are 
financial, and such ambiguity raises both technical considerations as 
well as opportunities for tax avoidance.48   
Fourth, there are likely to be important impacts on state 
government corporate tax systems, and these have also not been 
carefully considered.  Fifth, there are large transition effects associated 
with moving to a destination-basis cash flow system that would need 
                                                      
47 Auerbach & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 22. 
48 For a more detailed treatment of these complex issues, see David 
Weisbach, A Guide to the GOP Tax Plan – The Way to a Better Way, 8 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 171 (2017). See also Auerbach, et al., supra note 34. 
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to be carefully considered.49  
VI. PROGRESSIVITY AND REVENUE EFFECTS 
An essential problem with the Ryan Blueprint concerns the tax 
rates that were chosen.  These very low tax rates make the system 
likely to lose a large amount of revenue in a regressive manner. 
Indeed, the corporate rate chosen is intellectually incoherent.  
One of the purported advantages of a destination-basis corporate cash 
flow tax is that it is supposed to curb profit shifting by removing the 
incentive for shifting profits and activities abroad.  But, if that is the 
case, why is the rate cut needed? If tax burdens truly depend only on 
the location of immobile customers, why not keep the corporate rate at 
the same level as the top personal rate? The usual argument for the 
lower rate relies on the international mobility of income and 
competitiveness concerns.  If such concerns are moot, then there is no 
reason to tax at a low rate.   
Further, the discrepancy between the top personal rate and the 
business rate will create new avoidance opportunities as wealthy 
individuals seek to earn their income in tax-preferred ways, reducing 
their labor compensation in favor of business income.  Companies 
would be inclined to tilt executive compensation toward stock options 
and away from salary income, and high-income earners would be 
inclined to earn income through their businesses in pass-through form. 
The Ryan proposal exempts the normal return from capital, 
giving these returns zero-tax treatment.  Further, excess returns (profits 
above the normal level) are taxed through the business tax system, but 
at rates far lower than the top personal income tax rate.  The theoretical 
rationale for justifying such a favorable tax treatment for rents (excess 
profits) is simply absent.  From an efficiency or an equity perspective, 
taxing rents at a higher rate makes sense. 
Recent evidence from Treasury suggests that now about 75% 
of the corporate tax base is rents/extra-normal profits; this fraction has 
been steadily increasing.50  If destination-based taxes are meant to fall 
solely on rent, this implies a higher ideal optimal tax rate, since taxing 
                                                      
49 Absent relief, consumption taxes generate a tax on the initial capital 
stock; while this is an efficient tax (since it is an unexpected lump sum tax on the 
capital stock), it is arbitrary.  However, attempts to provide relief would be 
expensive and would reduce the progressivity of the tax system, since the capital 
stock is concentrated in the upper part of the income distribution.  See Weisbach, 
supra note 48.   
50 See Laura Power & Austin Frerick, Have Excess Returns to 
Corporations Been Increasing Over Time?, 69 NAT’L TAX J.  831, 831-46 (2016).   
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rents is far more efficient than taxing labor or capital.51  
Further, the regressive nature of these tax changes is 
unjustifiable given the increases in economic inequality over the 
previous decades and the large surge in the share of income earned by 
the top 1% of the income distribution.  Capital income, and rents, are 
far more concentrated than labor income.52  Cutting taxes on capital 
and rents so dramatically risks further exacerbating recent increases in 
income inequality.   
The Tax Policy Center calculates the distributional effect of the 
Ryan plan, which benefits the wealthy disproportionately.  The 
average federal tax rate falls by about 0.4 percentage points for the 
bottom 80% of the population, but it falls by 3.4 percentage points for 
the top quintile, and by 9 percentage points for the top 1%.  The top 
1% receive a tax cut that averages $213,000.  The tax cut of the bottom 
                                                      
51 Also note that double-taxation arguments are vastly overstated since 
about three-quarters of U.S. corporate equity income is not taxed at the individual 
level.  See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share 
of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923-34 (2016); Leonard Burman & 
Kimberly Clausing, Is U.S. Corporate Income Double-Taxed? 70 NAT’L TAX J.  
(forthcoming, Sept. 2017) (on file with authors).   
52 The U.S. Treasury reports that the top 5% of tax units report 24% of 
income in 1986 (the earliest year available), increasing to 37% in 2012.  See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI Tax Stats – Individual Statistical Tables by Tax 
Rate and Income Percentile (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-
individual-statistical-tables-by-tax-rate-and-income-percentile [perma.cc/G99F-
W2E4].  Indeed, capital income is much more concentrated that labor income.  
Data from the Tax Policy Center for 2012 indicate that the top 5% of tax units 
report 68% of dividend income and 87% of long-term capital gains income.  T09-
0492 - Distribution of Long-Term Capital Gains and Qualified Dividends by Cash 
Income Percentile, 2012, TAX POLICY CTR. (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/distribution-capital-gains-and-
qualified-dividends/distribution-long-term-capital-2 [perma.cc/Y4D8-FVSG].  The 
U.S. Treasury also reports data on the top 400 taxpayers.  This particularly small 
group of taxpayers reports 1.48% of total income in 2012, but 0.16% of total wage 
and salary income, 8.3% of total dividend income, and 12.3% of total capital gain 
income.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns 
Reporting the Largest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year, 1992–2013 (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13intop400.pdf [perma.cc/ZA26-XM7X].  The 
overall share of this tiny group has more than doubled since 1992 (when the data 
series begins).  The wage income share has been flat, while the capital gains share 
has more than doubled, and the dividends share has more than quadrupled.  All of 
these trends occur within a context where the labor share of income is falling 
relative to the capital share of income.  For more discussion of these trends, see 
Kimberly Clausing, Strengthening the Indispensable U.S. Corporate Tax,” WASH. 
CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://equitablegrowth.org/report/strengthening-the-indispensable-u-s-corporate-
tax/ [perma.cc/DQE8-WUMJ].   
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80% averages $210.53 
Finally, the Ryan proposal loses large amounts of tax revenue.  
The business tax features of the proposal are a large share of the ten-
year, $3 trillion revenue loss, according to the Tax Policy Center.  Prior 
research by Auerbach suggests that this type of corporate tax reform 
would not change revenue very much at the same corporate tax rate, 
and work by Devereux has suggested that the tax base would be 
smaller under a DBCT, but that this could be compensated for by 
higher rates.  Under the Ryan plan, however, the rate is much lower, 
leading to large deficits.54  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Ryan Blueprint destination-based cash-flow tax is not 
ready for prime-time.  No other country had adopted a similar tax, and 
as the above analysis makes clear, there are myriad issues that would 
need to be worked through before any such tax were adopted.  These 
issues are not small: the plan is incompatible with trade rules in a 
manner which harms our trading partners, it is incompatible with our 
treaty obligations, it is unlikely to end income shifting, it generates 
political problems due to large numbers of companies that would 
experience adverse tax treatment changes, it makes the tax system less 
progressive at the proposed tax rates, and it is likely to generate large 
revenue losses.  In addition, there are important issues surrounding 
how exporters with losses would be handled (which could lead to 
inefficient mergers), how financial firms and financial transactions 
would be handled, how U.S. state corporate tax systems would be 
affected, and how the transition to the new tax system would be 
handled.   
One pressing problem is that the Ryan blueprint is 
incompatible with WTO rules.  And this incompatibility is no mere 
                                                      
53 Burman et al., supra note 3, at 271 (Table 4).   
54 Some recent work by Treasury economists has a somewhat more 
optimistic view of the tax base under this type of tax system, but the additional size 
of the base comes entirely from the border adjustment.  See Elena Patel & John 
McClelland, What Would a Cash Flow Tax Look Like for U.S. Companies? 
Lessons from a Historical Panel (Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 116, 
2017).  It is important to note that the revenue from the border adjustment is 
contingent on the U.S. being in a trade deficit position.  Since trade deficits (and 
the associated financial borrowing) eventually have to be paid back in the form of 
trade surpluses, these revenue gains are really being borrowed from future U.S. 
taxpayers.  See Alan Viard, The Border Tax Adjustment Can’t Make Mexico Pay 
for the Wall, AEI, (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:45am), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-
border-tax-adjustment-cant-make-mexico-pay-for-the-wall/ [perma.cc/T8Q2-
TEKD]. 
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technicality.  U.S. trading partners are likely to be hurt in several ways.  
The effects of the wage deduction render the corporate cash-flow tax 
different from a VAT, and these differences have the net effect of 
increasing the incentive to operate in the United States, as both 
proponents and economists recognize.  In addition, such a tax system 
would exacerbate the profit-shifting problems of our trading partners, 
since the United States will appear like a tax haven from their 
perspective.  If multinational firms shift profits to the United States on 
paper, this will reduce foreign revenues without affecting U.S. 
revenues.   
While economists have argued that exchange rate changes may 
reduce trade-distorting effects of such tax law changes, there are 
several reasons to suspect that such exchange rate changes will not be 
sufficient to neutralize the effects of such a tax law change.  First, 
exchange rate changes are uniform, yet the export subsidy component 
of the DBCT plan would treat different firms differently.  Second, 
exchange rate markets are very large, exchange rate movements are 
not well predicted by economic fundamentals, and many countries fix 
their exchange rates, all factors that would reduce hopes of smooth 
countervailing exchange rate adjustment.  Third, exporting firms may 
receive incomplete loss offsets, and that would cause trade 
distortions.55   
However, even if these economic effects were disregarded, it 
is clear that the DBCT is on shaky legal ground with respect to both 
WTO rules and our tax treaties.  The WTO is likely to recognize that 
this DBCT is non-equivalent to a VAT, and thus a direct tax, where 
border adjustments are not allowed.  This will likely lead to years of 
litigation and perhaps an endgame whereby the DBCT is simply 
jettisoned in favor of a VAT.  This would convert one of the most 
progressive tax instruments in our tax system into a regressive 
consumption tax.  In the meantime, we are likely to face the prospect 
of large tariff retaliations by our trading partners, in an environment 
where the incoming U.S. administration has already provided ample 
reason to fear trade wars. 
                                                      
55 Even if the dollar appreciates fully, there are still serious concerns.  
Exchange rate appreciation generates its own risks to the world economy, 
generating serious financial vulnerability in a large number of countries that have 
substantial dollar liabilities.  Dollar appreciation will also result in a multi trillion-
dollar deterioration in the U.S. net international investment position, a large wealth 
redistribution away from U.S. holders of foreign assets and toward foreign holders 
of U.S. assets. 
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Given these concerns, we would recommend that Congress 
reject the Ryan Blueprint.  Instead, it should focus on a revenue-neutral 
tax reform that reduces the corporate tax rate and eliminates the major 
corporate tax expenditures including deferral, taxing accumulated 
offshore earnings in full.  Eliminating deferral would eliminate the 
incentive to earn income in low-tax countries, by treating foreign and 
domestic income alike for tax purposes.  Pairing that reform with a 
lower corporate tax rate need not raise tax burdens on average, 
although it would create winners and losers among corporate 
taxpayers.  A more fundamental reform would require worldwide 
corporate tax consolidation; this would better align the tax system with 
the reality of globally-integrated corporations. 
Taxing foreign income currently also eliminates the incentive 
to build up large stocks of unrepatriated foreign income, now estimated 
at $2.6 trillion.  This income is often invested in U.S. capital markets, 
and it increases the creditworthiness of U.S. multinational 
corporations, who can easily finance worthy investments.  But 
corporations are inhibited from repatriation by the prospect of more 
favorable tax treatment if they delay, so this makes it difficult for them 
to return profits to shareholders.  Indeed these concerns about 
repatriation are likely to give the multinational business community a 
large interest in corporate tax reform.  Settling the future tax treatment 
of foreign income should be a key goal of these efforts.56   
In terms of more incremental reforms, even a per-country 
minimum tax would be a big step toward reducing profit shifting 
toward tax havens and protecting the corporate tax base.  A minimum 
tax would currently tax income earned in the lowest tax countries, and 
work by Clausing suggests that 98% of the profit shifting out of the 
United States is destined for countries with foreign tax rates below 
15%.57  Other helpful incremental steps include stronger “earnings-
stripping” rules and anti-corporate inversion measures such as an exit 
tax. 
                                                      
56 Toward this end, the U.S. Congress did a great disservice when they 
enacted a one-time holiday on dividend repatriation as part of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.  American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 
118 Stat. 1418 (2004).  Ever since, companies have been more likely to delay 
repatriation in the hope of future holidays (or permanently more favorable 
treatment). 
57 See Kimberly Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate 
Tax Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J.  905, 905-34 (2016).   
